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THE "CONTINUATION" OF THE ODYSSEY¹

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C. THE NEKYIA

The end of the *Odyssey* fell into disrepute at a very early date. Aristophanes and Aristarchus, οἱ κορυφαῖοι τῶν τότε γραμματικῶν, pronounced ψ 296 the τέλος or πέρας, but the terms in which their judgment has been transmitted are unfortunately such that οἱ κορυφαῖοι τῶν νῦν Ὀμηρικῶν are not at one as to their import. The point has not been carefully discussed by many authorities, but those who have done so are among the best.

The relevant citations are given by Ludwich (*Aristarchs hom. Textkr.*, I, 630 f.) and by Pierron on ψ 296. Both are satisfied, and Römer (*Technik d. hom. Gesänge*, 514) agrees, that the two great critics did not athetize the "Continuation" and declare it a spurious addition to Homer's work, but only meant to indicate that the great ἀγών of Odysseus was at an end with his reunion with Penelopé. In Pierron's words, they applied the epic rules of Aristotle and spoke *au point de vue littéraire, et non comme philologues*, or, in those of Eustathius, οὐ τὸ βιβλίον τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας ἀλλ' ἵσως τὰ καίρια ταύτης ἐνταῦθα συντετελέσθαι. So Mure (*Hist. Gk. Lit.*, II, 189); Aristarchus did athetize the *Nekyia*, and as his specific arguments affect it alone, there is an implication that he objected to the "Continuation" as a whole only on poetical grounds.

Among those who take the contrary view are Kirchhoff, Blass, and Monro. The first-named (*Odyssee*², 532) seems to deny the atheteses within the "Continuation," but these are undeniable. Blass (*Interpol.*, 214), quoting the scholium Ἀριστοφάνης καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος πέρας τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας τοῦτο ποιοῦνται, is convinced, "though he cannot prove it," that this was not a mere conjecture, but a tradition, and that there were copies or editions which closed at this point. Monro (on ψ 296) thinks Aristarchus distinguished between a continuation by a late poet and two still later interpola-

¹ Cf. *C.P.*, VIII, 284; IX, 35.

tions. Only these latter were athetized "in the strict sense" and had the obelus, which was not available for the longer excision.

The use of the words *τέλος* and *πέρας* appears to support Ludwig's view. See the discussion of these terms in Schmidt's *Synonymik*, 404 ff., and cf. Professor Scott in *Class. Jour.*, VIII, 221; *τέλος* is not *finis*, but "goal" or *Ziel*—"consummation." Belzner (*Komposn. d. Od.*, 202) quotes Eustathius' *σκοπιμώτατον τέλος τῆς Ὀδυσσείας* of the *μνηστηροφονία*. The fact that there were atheteses within the "Continuation" points in the same direction. The words of Aristarchus would easily come to be interpreted as meaning that all after ψ 296 was spurious. "Poor Aristarchus" suffered much at the hands of scribes and excerptors (Römer, *Philologus*, LXX, 321 ff., and *Aristarchs Athetesen*, 58); he has been much misrepresented. In the present case we can only say it is not proved that he believed the "Continuation" a late addition.¹ And the discussion has after all no great practical interest. Whatever the opinion of the Alexandrians, we can come to a conclusion for ourselves, and on the basis of much better materials than they possessed.

The starting-point in modern treatment of the question is Spohn's *De extrema Odysseae parte* (1816),² a clearly written treatise, but swollen by digressions of no interest now, and by what he himself admits are *minutae observationes*. It has been highly praised by Kayser, Blass, Wilamowitz, and others. Schädel (*Das epische Thema d. Odyssee*) even says it marks *die Meta der Wissenschaft*, and adds—with some ground, it must be admitted—that since Spohn's work appeared peace has reigned in regard to the "Continuation." But Spohn has been accepted too readily. One wonders how many of those who have given their adherence to his views have examined for themselves the various points raised by him, and have reflected how far Homeric study has advanced in a century. In the sphere of the *Realien* he several times remarks on the simplicity and rudeness of the age and culture mirrored in the poems, and uses them in argument. We look on these with different eyes in these days. Similarly his linguistic case is quite out of date. Only in the realm

¹ The suggestion of E. Meyer in *Hermes*, XXIX, 478, has an extremely slight basis in the last line of the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius, ἀσπασίως ἀκτὰς Παγασήϊδας εἰσαπέβητε.

² Expanded from his Doctor's dissertation of 1815 with the same title.

of the repetitions would he have a ready and whole-hearted following now—by critics of a certain school.

Spohn was followed by Liesegang (*De extrema Odysseae parte* [1855]), who examined the "Continuation" line by line, correcting Spohn's errors and committing not a few of his own.¹ The linguistic side of the dissertation is minute, but poor in quality. Much is made of ἄ. λλ., and of words (*ἱππεύς*, *βρότος* and *βροτόεις*, *θύνω*, *ἀλαλητός*, etc.) which are peculiar to the *Iliad*, and naturally appear but rarely in the *Odyssey*. The case is strengthened by the assumption that other occurrences of words are in "late" passages. There is a good discussion of *γῆρας ἔχεις*, ω 250, but there is no reference to the variant reading, *γῆρας ἔχει σ'* (Cobet, *Misc. Crit.*, 430). Much space is devoted to the repetitions, and much to what must be deemed mere micrology. Liesegang appears to forget his own caution in regard to *leves parvaeque res*.

These two treatises appeared at a time when all efforts of the kind were welcomed with unholy joy, and they have been very successful. They are always quoted and implicitly trusted by all who take the unfavorable view of the "Continuation." Condemnation has been very general, and in respect of the *Nekyia* so universal that the authorities who have dared to defend it might be counted on the fingers of one hand. When one says that even Colonel Mure, Oskar Jäger, Kiene, and Belzner give up the *Nekyia*, it will be understood how desperate the case is.

It was Aristarchus who commenced the attack, by observing the un-Homeric character of *Hermes* and the action attributed to him in the first lines of ω, and the heresy has never been purged. It is regarded as the obliquity of a Homerid who lived in days when ideas were held far different from those of Homer. First, we have *Hermes* called *Κυλλήμιος*—"as Aristarchus observed, a post-Homeric epithet" (Monro). The remark seems to beg the question. The epithet was used after Homer's day, certainly, but that does not prove that Homer did not know it. The point is, what evidence is there that the epithet was not known to the *Ur-Homer*? Only

¹ On ω 68, see A 49, II 165; on ω 149, cf. ε 396, τ 201, λ 61; on ω 179, see σ 64; on ω 189, see λ 41; on ω 220, besides Ω 717 see χ 479 and ω 545; the uses of *δρκια τάμνειν* and *δρκια τιθέναι* are to be distinguished, etc.

this apparently, that often as Hermes appears before ω , he is never called Κυλλήνιος. But Apollo is Σμινθεύς and Ἑκατηβελέτης only once, and ἥϊος only twice. So for ἀγροτέρη, of Artemis, and χρυσήνιος, of her (and Ares). Hermes himself is σῶκος only once, Μαιάδος υἱός but once, and ἀκάκητα only once outside ω . Aphrodité is Κύπρις only in E. But it will be said that her Cyprian cult is known from θ , whereas Homer, though he knows Mount Κυλλήνη (B 603) and has the adjective Κυλλήνιος (O 518) of Kyllené, the town in Elis, does not mention the worship of Hermes in either locality. True, but that does not prove he did not know it. On the other hand, Dr. Farnell (*Cults*, V, 1 ff.) shows that Hermes was the old god of Arcadia, and that thence the Elian cult, which "bears marks of great antiquity," was derived. There is thus rather a presumption in favor of Κυλλήνιος being ancient. Its solitary occurrence can, we have seen, be paralleled. Dioné is on the stage but once, in a passage in E where we are said to find ourselves in just such an "un-Homeric atmosphere" as that of ω . Yet she is *uralt* (Drerup, *Das fünfte Buch der Ilias*, 191); of "an antiquity more remote than that of Hera" (Leaf on E 370).

But further, Hermes performs an unusual function. "Aristarchus argues with great force that the function here attributed to Hermes—that of conducting souls to Hades (ψυχοπομπός)—is nowhere else mentioned in Homer. The passing-away of life is so often described in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that this argument is as strong as any argument *ex silentio* can be" (Monro on ω 2). Again we must dismiss the mere fact of solitariness. As Mr. Andrew Lang says (*H. and E.*, 316), we cannot call it a novelty. "Homer has had no previous occasion to describe it." Dr. Monro says Homer has had frequent occasion, and to that I shall return; but certainly there is no other similar state occasion, on which a distinguished troupe have to be removed to the nether-world, where the poet wants them for the purpose of a colloquy. He must be given some license in the making of his story. He introduces the helm of Hades, the charmed girdle of Aphrodité, and the doves who bring Father Zeus supplies of ambrosia, only once, and Apollo's interest in wrestling is unknown outside Ψ 660 f. Far too much importance is attached to singularities in the poems. The present objection is like the remark of Dr.

Leaf on A 334 (repeated by Cauer in his edition of Ameis-Hentze), that only in post-Homeric times is Hermes the patron of heralds. But surely it is extremely probable, seeing that Hermes frequently performs functions analogous to those of heralds on earth, and that he has in "his opiate rod" the symbol of office which the herald on earth had in his *σκήπτρον*, that the god was already the patron of these officials on earth. But for the episode of the scar in τ , we should not know that to Homer, Hermes, though already a thief (E 390, Ω 24), was, to use Dr. Farnell's description, the "patron of thieves, liars, and defrauders."

And, though the function of *ψυχοπομπός* has only this one mention, there are various incidents and references in the poems which may incline us to accept it as an established fact. Hermes is already *πομπός* *par excellence* on earth— Ω 334 f., *σοὶ γὰρ τε μάλιστά γε φίλτατόν ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ ἐταιρίσσαι*, Ω 153, etc.; and Putsch (*De variis dei Mercur. apud Hom. muneribus*, 15) consequently describes his action in ω as *non novum munus*. Cf. the *ἄμ' ὀπῆδει* of τ 398. A *πομπός* for a soul on its way to the realm below is even mentioned in the grim jest in N 414, and we twice find the expression *κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι* (B 302, ξ 207). These *κῆρες* Rohde calls *Hadesdämonen*. Hermes once escorted, not indeed a *ψυχή*, but Herakles *αὐτός*, to Hades (λ 626, Θ 366 ff.), and rescued Ares from confinement (E 390), not in Hades, but possibly enough from what may be described as *ὑπὸ κείθεσι γαίης*.¹ It is true that Hermes is not represented as "Lord of Death." But he is Lord of Sleep (η 138, Ω 343 f., 445, ϵ 47 f.), and Sleep is "Death's twin brother" (E 231, II 672, 682). See Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* "Hermes," 789, and Eitrem, *Hermes u. d. Toten*, 76. "Death is but a sleep," and "from god of sleep to god of death the way is short and easy."

The epithets of the god are all so obscure that little is to be gleaned from them, though they have been discussed over and over again. But it may be observed, as regards *διάκροπος*, that it is not uncommon to find the admission that it may after all be from *διά + ἄγω*, in which case the fact that Hades has gates to be passed "through" (E 646, etc.) would have significance. Boisacq's *dis-*

¹ This on the interpretations of the mythologists. See now the note on p. 178 of Drerup's work on E—*einem unterirdischen Kerker*?

pensateur (apparently of) *honneurs funèbres* (διά+κτερ—in κτέρεα) would be still more significant. As regards Ἀργεῖφόντης, there is a similar amount of agreement that something like "destroyer of light" (cf. the Homeric phrase λείπειν φάος ἡελίοιο) is a not unlikely interpretation—*significatio consentanea* *Mercurio ψυχοπομπῶ*, Neckel says in a paper on the epithet.¹ Gruppe (*Griech. Mythol. u. Religionsgesch.*, 1324 ff.) argues for a reference to liberated souls. And on the whole the two words appear to point to some such function as that now under discussion. The rarer ἐριούσιος and ἀκάκητα have also been interpreted to the same effect.

But these are only indications. It is much more important to see whether we have not grounds, on materials which Aristarchus "never knew," for saying that the psychopompic function was *uralt*. Now, in the first place, that Hermes was already an ancient deity with a long history behind him, even in Homeric days—whatever we may understand by that expression—seems to be well ascertained. He is said by the authorities, as Farnell,² Gruppe, and Preller-Robert, to be pre-Hellenic and Pelasgian. "Der ganze Kultus scheint von der Urzeit zu stammen" (Eitrem, *op. cit.*, 68). The god is of the *Urbewölkerung* (Fick, *Ortsnamen*, 131; Siecke, *Hermes der Mondgott*, 16). Fick (*Hattiden*, 45) makes the god's mother Maia (whom Homer knows) = Ma, the All-Mother. Hermes, her son, is the (ithyphallic) Hermes of Kyllené, where his cult was certainly of hoary antiquity.

Consequently there was ample time, before the epic, for the many functions of Hermes to develop. Can we then say that the one denoted by ψυχοπομπός was primeval? We must depend on the results achieved by the mythological experts. From the authorities first to hand, Dr. Farnell's work (V, 1 ff.) and those of Gruppe and Rohde already mentioned, and Eitrem's article in Pauly-Wissowa, I find that Hermes was Chthonian and lord of death

¹ It is suggested in *B. ph. W.* (1913), 756, that the epithet may be of eastern origin (came with Hermes from Anatolia?), the similar form Βελλεροφόντης being styled "pure Lycian." But -ντ- is not necessarily a non-Greek mark. For the discussions of διάκροπος see Ostergaard in *Hermes*, XXXVII, 333 ff. He arrives at the meaning διάφθορος. But his argument is spoiled by the assumption that a number of passages are late.

² See *Cults*, II, 619, for the evidence available for a decision of the kind in regard to a given deity, and cf. *Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, 18.

"probably in the earliest period"; that it is likely that his Arcadian worship came from Anatolia, for, though there is no sure clue to his worship there, Fick's study of Arcadian names has shown that the Anatolians had their congeners in Greece before the arrival of the Hellenes; and that (Eitrem, *op. cit.*, 790; Farnell, *op. cit.*, 14, note) Professor Sir William Ramsay has discovered (*J.H.S.*, III, 9 f.) the conception of Hermes *ψυχοπομπός* on an ancient Phrygian rock tomb. From Gruppe we learn that Hermes' very name may point to connection with the underworld, and that the office of *Seelenführer* is one of his *Urfunktionen*. Indeed Gruppe looks on the terrestrial office denoted by *πομπός* and *ἡγεμόνιος*, and known to Homer, as derived from it. Rohde, albeit to him Homer was Ionian and his lays are conveniently "late" and "early" for the argument in *Psyche*, tells us that the author of *ω*, though late, no doubt borrowed the *ψυχοπομπός* notion *aus altem Volksglaubens*.

The conclusion we are led to, then, by recognized authorities is that Hermes *ψυχοπομπός* was very ancient. The mention of that side of the god's activity should not be considered strange; and the solitary mention is, we have seen, no ground for suspicion. According to one school of mythologists (see Miss Harrison, *Themis*, 295) "Homer forgets much." A simpler view is that he does not pretend to give a complete picture of any individual in his pantheon. He uses the qualities, powers, and attributes of a divine personage only for his own purposes, as opportunity arises or the necessity of his story compels.

The burden is on the objectors of showing that the function in question was not known to Homer. They cannot prove the negative;¹ on the other hand, the mythologists favor the positive view. The objection would have force only if we could say that the conception of any Homeric deity, as we can compile it from references in the poems, must include every feature of the cult of that deity as known in the early days when Homer wrote—which would be absurd. Take the case of Artemis. In the poems she is a graceful maiden, fond of the chase; she administers easy death to human beings;

¹ They hardly make the attempt. Arguments are surely difficult to adduce when Hennings (*Odyssee*, 587) actually says *heisst es doch von den εὐρώεντα κέλευθα (οἰκία?)*, T 65, *τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ!*

and she at times avenges insults done to her. We now know a good deal more about her early history, by reference to the second volume of Farnell's work and recent *B.S.A.*'s. And cf. Mr. Thompson in *J.H.S.* (1909), 306 f. Her origin, like Hermes', "doubtless lies in an age far beyond the age of Homer" (Miss Lorimer in *Proc. Class. Assoc.* [1912], II).

But there is yet another difficulty presented to us. Hermes, it is said, does violence to custom in taking the Souls of the Wooers to Hades before their bodies had had burial. ἀλλ' αὐται καὶ ἄταφοι κατῴσιν (schol. min.), or, as Eustathius put the objection, πῶς δέ, φασί, καὶ ἐπιμύγνυνται τοῖς νεκροῖς οἱ μνηστῆρες, ὅπου Πάτροκλον οὐκ ἔωσι μίσγεσθαι ἄταφον ὄντα. The moderns drag in Elpenor, as well as Patroclus. "So too Elpenor, the companion left unburied in the island of Circé, is met at the entrance of Hades, and entreats Ulysses to grant him funeral rites, without which, as we may gather—though it is not expressly said—he will not be able to pass the gates of Hades. The contradiction is plain" (Monro on ω 11–13).

This is an extremely interesting piece of Homeric criticism, and it deserves careful attention. First, Elpenor must be eliminated altogether. As Dr. Monro says, it is not expressly said that he is barred from association with the community of ψυχαί in Hades, and there is nothing in λ 13 ff. to warrant us in inferring that. In that book, when Odysseus reaches the spot indicated by Circé and has made his preparations, the ghosts appear ὑπὲξ Ἑρέβους (36 f.). Odysseus takes his seat by the βόθρος he had dug, and keeps off the crowd, waiting for Teiresias. Then (51) πρώτη δὲ ψυχὴ Ἑλπήνορος ἦλθε, "for he had not been buried . . . his corpse had been left in the house of Circé unwept and unburied." This might suggest that Elpenor is not consorting with the other souls; but he himself, in his reply to Odysseus, 72 f., makes no complaint of exclusion. He begs for burial when Odysseus goes back, only μή τοί τι θεῶν μῆνιμα γένωμαι. If the poet meant that Elpenor was in the unfortunate position of Patroclus, when he appeared to Achilles in Ψ, it is strange that Elpenor, or the poet for him, does not say so. The reason which is given is a quite sufficient one.

But let us assume that Elpenor was, like Patroclus, debarred from the general society in Hades. We then have two cases to establish

the rule which the author of our *Nekyia* is said to break, when he represents Hermes as escorting the souls of unburied men to Hades. But, unfortunately for the opposition, these two cases are extremely weak. That of Patroclus is related in a book which has been generally decried as late and "Odyssean," and the passage describing the appearance of Patroclus has been a particular butt of adverse criticism. See the introduction to Ψ in Ameis-Hentze's *Anhang*. And for Elpenor's case see, e.g., Lillge, "*Nekyia*," in *Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen* (1911), 79, and the note of Merry and Riddell—the fairest of commentators—to λ 51. They conclude that "it seems difficult to accept" the episode as genuine. So dissectors of the poems must not present these two instances, discredited by their own side, to us as establishing a rule by which we are to be bound.

However, we will grant to them (what we ourselves, in spite of the adverse criticism, are quite ready to believe) that these two instances are genuine, and we will also grant that two to one (the one being the infirm case in our *Nekyia*) is an overwhelming proportion. We observe that the case against the action of Hermes in ω is strengthened by an argument *ex reticentia Homeri*. "The passing-away of life," says Dr. Monro as already quoted, "is so often described in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that this argument [that Hermes $\psi\chi\omicron\pi\omicron\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ is nowhere mentioned in Homer] is as strong as any argument *ex silentio* can be." Apply this, then, to the cases of Patroclus and Elpenor, which we are allowing the opposition to regard as thoroughly established. "The passing-away of life" is often described in the *Iliad*. Warriors are slain on the battle-field and their $\psi\chi\alpha\acute{\iota}$ hie away to Hades, *eis* "Ἐρεβος, "Αἰδόσδε, δόμον "Αἰδος εἰσω, and so forth, and their bodies remain on the field unburied to be devoured by dogs and birds—but never a reference to the disability to which they are all to be subjected in the nether world for want of the rites of sepulture. Nor, when Elpenor gets his wish and is decently buried, μ 8 ff., is it stated that now he will have full rights in the world below. Is this not "as strong as any argument *ex silentio* can be" against the existence of any such bar to admission to Hades because there has been no funeral? Erhardt, discussing the passage in Ψ (*Entstehung der homn. Gedichte*, 449), admits that our *Nekyia* is in accord with the general Homeric view.

So the *καὶ ἄταφοι κατῴσιν* argument proves nothing against us. There are two cases, allowing Elpenor's to be on a par with that of Patroclus, of the souls of unburied men being excluded from Hades, but there are many others of men in similar case, with regard to whom we hear of no hitch about their admission to Hades. These are treated like the Wooers. In fact, the argument is reduced to Ψ versus ω , and we may take our choice. We can keep both, and Homer is not a penny the worse.

But there are other strange things. In ω 11 f. Hermes and the Souls of the Wooers went *πάρ . . . Ὀκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην, ἥδὲ παρ' Ἡελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων*, and we hear of this White Rock, these Gates of the Sun, and this Land of Dreams nowhere else in the poems. Like many other things, they happen to be mentioned by Homer only once, but it is hardly necessary to say more on that point. In E we similarly "find ourselves in a world of myths of which we know nothing elsewhere" (Leaf, *Introduction*), but we are not likely to hear much of this peculiarity after Drerup's masterly vindication of that book. The criticism that made the variety and wealth of the Homeric mythology a means of vexing the poet's mind has had its day.

The Gates "doubtless belong to the conception of Hades which places it in the darkness of the extreme West," and are "those which the sun enters at his setting" (Monro); and so most commentators. An objection would hardly be founded on this nowadays. Similarly the notion of a Dreamland (like the Gates, in the vicinity of Hades, ω 13) "is not inconsistent with the account in τ 562 ff. of the two gates out of which dreams issue." Liesegang alleges imitation of Hesiod (*Theogon.* 758 f.), but no grounds are stated. *Sic vult, sic jubet*. Hennings follows suit and adds *Theogon.* 212, apparently because it mentions a *φῶλον ὀνείρων*. Are we to suppose there was, in the popular imagination, no Dreamland, no realm of Death and Sleep—*consanguineus leti*—before Hesiod's day? Did primitive man assign no local habitation to the dreams, and the *revenant ψυχή* seen in dreams, on which philosophers have built up theories of savage religion? In Homer the connection of the dream and the *ψυχή*—"das andre Ich," as Rohde describes it, "dessen Reich ist die Traumwelt"—is close enough. The two are likened to each other in λ 207, 222,

and they are described by the same word, εἶδωλον (Ψ 72, 104, and in λ). See Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*, 524, and cf. λ 29 with τ 562.

The expression Λευκὰς πέτρῃ ("white rock," as in Eurip. *Cycl.* 166) has been given many interpretations. Barnes thought of his own Albion, Krichenbauer of the Peak of Teneriffe, and Breusing of the "snow-clad peak of Atlas." Others have gone to Gibraltar, others again to Achilles' island of Leuké. And many other white cliffs could no doubt be found. It has also been suggested that the rock is the πέτρῃ in Hades mentioned by Circé, κ 515 (M. and R., *ad loc.*, and Hayman on ω 11),¹ a "Felsen der Verwesung [the Αἰαίνου λίθος of *Ranae* 194] mit den bleichenden Gebeinen," λεῖκ' ὅστέα (Preller-Robert, 814). This is the *märchenhaft* view, to which mention of the Gates of the Sun and of Dreamland is supposed to lend support. Such a rock is found in other mythologies (Gerland, *Altgriech. Märchen in d. Od.*, 40).

But discussions on the great and fascinating Leukas-Ithaka question appear to have settled that the Λευκὰς πέτρῃ is the point in which the long southern strip of Leukas ends, the cape known to the ancients as Leukatas and in these days as Kap Dukato (cf. Γυραῖν πέτρῃ, δ 507, and perhaps πέτρῃ Ὠλενίῃ, B 617). The promontory, conspicuous for its white cliffs, which rise to a height of 300 meters, lies some ten miles to the northwest of Ithaka (Thiaki), and its identity with the Λευκὰς πέτρῃ is accepted by some prominent writers on either side in the great dispute. I may refer to Rüter, *Mit Dörpfeld nach Leukas-Ithaka*, 37 f.; Thomopoulos, *Ithaka u. Homer* (German summary), 40 n.; Groeschl., *Dörpfelds Leukas-Hypothese*, 23; Bérard, II, 422; Allen in *C.R.*, XX, 270, and *J.H.S.*, XXX, 306 f.; Gruhn, *Kyklopen u. Phäaken*, 49; Paulatos, Η ΠΑΤΡΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ, 81; Goessler, *Leukas-Ithaka*, 38; and Gustav Lang, *Untersuchgn. zur Geogr. d. Od.*, 77. These take the πέτρῃ out of the realm of fiction and restore it to the world of reality from which Hermes takes his start. The identification is used by the several partisans each in his own interest, but all agree that Hermes, after leaving the home of Odysseus, be that Thiaki or Leukas, makes for the sea² on his way to

¹ Possibly also in a line which some added after Ξ 279.

² The Ὠκεανὸς ῥοαί may well be (as has been thought) the Adriatic, which was, for long after Homer's day, an inhospitable *mare clausum* (Myres in *Proc. Class. Assoc.* [1911], 60).

Hades, vaguely conceived as in a westerly, or possibly a north-westerly, direction, in a region of Cimmerian mist near the sun's setting-place. To reach the expanse of sea in the west, he must pass the *πέτρη*, which is specially mentioned by Homer because of its prominence in the seascape, and as Land's End, the last point on *terra firma* before the plunge into the unknown. Its mention in no way discredits our passage.¹

The only other mythological offense is in the mention of nine Muses in the account of the obsequies of Achilles, *ω* 60 f.—*Μοῦσαι δ' ἐννέα πᾶσαι ἀμειβόμεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ θρήνηον*. Elsewhere in the poems we have simply *Μοῦσα*, or *Μοῦσαι* without any number being specified. As nine Muses are mentioned in Hesiod, *Theogon.* 65 and 76, this is said to be a sign of lateness.

The *ἀπορία* in antiquity, *ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν τὰς Μούσας οὐχ Ὀμηρικόν*, was answered by the *λύσις*, *τί κωλύει ἄπαξ*; Liesegang thinks "foolishly," others will say, quite satisfactorily. Monro points out that the words do not necessarily imply that the Muses were nine; only that "nine in all" took part. *ἐννέα* is, as he adds, "a favorite" (round) "number with Homer." Nothing in the Homeric passages forbids us to believe either that the poet of *ω* conceived the Muses as of indefinite number, or that the supposed earlier poets knew they were nine, though they do not happen to say so.

The un-Homeric atmosphere seems to have cleared. But, even if various differences in matters mythological between *ω* and other parts of the poems were established, we should still feel justified in contesting the inference that they point to a different author in a later age. If we are to trust the authorities, this is a department of human belief and fancy in which, in early ages—not to use a wider

¹ A fresh perusal of the now plentiful Leukas-Ithaka literature suggests the following remarks: (1) If the *Λευκὰς πέτρη* is Kap Dukato, then, as it is apparently not in Homer's Ithaka (Groeschl, *op. cit.*, 23), Leukas would appear not to be that Ithaka. (2) It is an extremely weak point in Dörpfeld's theory that he has to assume the lateness of the *Catalogue*, recently vindicated as ancient by Allen, *op. cit.*, and Thompson, *Liverpool Annals*, IV, 128 ff., and of *ω*. It is admitted that the Ithaka of the *Catalogue* is Thiaki. (3) *ἀμφιάλος* does, in spite of the pleading of the Leukadists, seem more appropriate to Thiaki than to Leukas, even admitting that the latter has *always* been an island. (4) *οὐχ ἱππῆλατος* can be said of Thiaki, not of Leukas. (5) The dawn does not come to Leukas *παρ' Ὠκεανοῦ ῥόδων* (*χ* 197). (6) There seems much force in a remark attributed to Wilamowitz, that it is very strange that Homer's descriptions of his Ithaka contain no allusion to the white cliffs which are so conspicuous a feature of Leukas.

term—great variety and latitude¹ have always prevailed, a *Freiheit fast Freigeistigkeit* which inevitably produces *manchen Abirrungen im Einzelnen* (Rohde, 35 f.). Such characteristics of the religious system—so to call it—of the Homeric poems have often been noted. In regard to the hereafter, “least of all,” Professor Seymour says, “is strict consistency to be expected or demanded.” So Mr. Andrew Lang—and who knew better than he?—“all theories of the state of the dead are full of similar contradictions” (*H. and E.*, 317). Shakespeare, as German critics have pointed out, is not consistent within the limits of *Hamlet*. From out the bourne from which no traveler returns there comes a ghost, an active peremptory ghost. It is no worse than this when Homer describes Odysseus as sitting with drawn sword to frighten a crowd of wraiths that are as “shadows or dreams” and are said to have no bodily force; it is by comparison a trifle when he pictures *ψυχαι* as now flitting off to the halls of Hades as soon as death has released them, now as carried thither by *Hades-dämonen*, and yet again, on a special occasion, as escorted by Hermes, Lord of Death. Archaeology even suggests that the Homeric poems belong to an intermediate age when sepulture and cremation existing side by side mark the conflict of two attitudes toward the future state—a condition of things which would “lead the poet to some inconsistency of language” (Leaf, *Iliad*, Vol. II, 621 f.). For the Viking age in Northern Europe, cf. Chadwick, *The Heroic Age*, chap. xviii, especially p. 398.

One obvious explanation of such inconsistency is given by Pasteris, *I miti inferni in Omero*, chap. ii. Homer used the *miti popolari* of his day, all crude, various, and unstable, no doubt. But he also had the poet's privilege of embellishing them, “the imagination of the poet alternating with that of the folk,” and of adapting them to the needs of his tale. So Draheim, *Die Odyssee als Kunstwerk*, 93; the general view of the kingdom of the dead was no poetic fiction, but “a popular belief.” Nevertheless the poet could *ohne Weiteres* in a further presentation of it introduce Hermes *ψυχοπομπός*, and “both accounts have their poetic worth.” It is niggling criticism to

¹And more than that. “The same people at the same period can hold *entirely contradictory ideas* about the place and the lot of the ghost.”—W. Farnell in *Folk-Lore* (1913), 391.

refuse to let the poet's fancy play and to forget that he is telling a story.¹ Rohde even admits that the *Grundstellungen* in the two *Nekyias* are the same—as Pasteris puts it (55 f.), “popolare nel fondo, e poetico solo in alcuni particolari quasi inevitabili all' artista, che Homero qua e là vi aveva aggiunto.” And cf. Hammer, *Quid Homerus de rebus inferis censuerit*, 13. The demand for completeness, accuracy, and symmetry in Homer's *Realien* is always unreasonable, and specially so in regard to the things that are unseen. The Greeks never had, we are told, a generally accepted system of dogmatic theology, with hell and the grave defined in a *credo*. In the infancy of the race, such theology as they had was *vago, pauroso, incerto*, and as such it is reflected in the national epic. But over all the diversity there is, in that epic, a uniformity even in this matter, a uniformity of a kind to suggest a single author of the poems. Professor Drerup finishes his study of religion as it is in Homer by saying that the treatment of divine matters, so full of contradictions at the first glance, “sich auflöst in der Harmonie einer höheren Einheit, in der reichen künstlerischen Persönlichkeit eines Dichters” (*op. cit.*, 420). The attempts to disprove that single personality which have been based on religious and mythological differences have failed as signally as the linguistic tests to provide any satisfying conclusion.

This paper was to have dealt with the whole question of the *Nekyia*, but I must pause here. The other objections to it, mere trifles compared with those based on the mythology, as well as to the “Recognition” scene in ω and the close of the book, must be reserved for later. I have already trespassed too freely on the generosity of the editor.

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¹ In fact to repeat seriously Lucian's “Ὁμηρος οὐ πᾶν ἀκριβῶς συνέγραψε.